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1Executive summary 
The intervention of the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics 
(ICRISAT) at the benchmark site in Madhya Pradesh, India is part of a larger project – 
“Improving Management of Natural Resources for Sustainable Rainfed Agriculture” 
funded by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The main aim of the project is to 
increase the productivity and sustainability of the medium and high water-holding 
capacity soils in the intermediate rainfall ecoregions in India, Vietnam, and Thailand. 
This study examines the relationship between land size and various variables including 
the soybean productivity relationship among owner-operated and share cropper-operated 
farms. Primary data was collected using an interview schedule from the villages of Jaoti, 
Kundhankhedi, Kherkhedi, and Lalatora in Vidisha district, Madhya Pradesh for the 1999 
rainy season crop. The productivity of evaluated owner-operated farms is marginally 
higher at 0.72 t ha
-1
 compared to 0.68 t ha
-1
in case of share cropped farms. The 
productivity of evaluated trial farms in Lalatora micro-watershed which is used as a 
demonstration micro-watershed for evaluating improved management practice has been 
higher at 1.1 t ha
-1
. The inverse-relationship between land size and productivity is found 
for both owner-operated (r = 0.27) and share cropper-operated farms (r = 0.30). The 
average profit is higher among owner-operated farms at Rs. 2045 ha
-1
 compared to Rs. 
1773 ha
-1
 among share cropped farms. The profitability for the landlords and share 
croppers is documented and evidence is presented on the exploitative nature of the 
emerging 20:80 crop sharing contract. The low productivity has been due to waterlogging 
which occurred due to heavy rains during the sowing period. 
 The implications of the endemic nature of the low productivity under a liberalized 
trade regime is analyzed. The Madhya Pradesh Government needs to embark on a pro-
active policy on tenancy reforms in the mission mode. There is a need for concerted 
efforts to reduce rainy season fallows in the watershed through appropriate technical 
interventions. The future intervention needs to examine the equity aspects in selection of 
trial farmers in other micro-watersheds, and waterlogging problem needs to be addressed 
in a participatory mode with initiation of experiments in pilot areas. The project 
implementing agency, Bharatiya Agro-Industries Foundation (BAIF) should play a 
stronger role in strengthening and linking the self-help groups (SHGs) to the formal 
credit market and a separate intervention strategy needs to be devised for the landless 
share croppers. 
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2Introduction
The importance of a well-defined rural development strategy in the growth and 
development of India can never be overstated. The analysis of the national income 
statistics reveals that the share of agriculture in the net domestic product has fallen from 
54% in 1931 to only 28% in 1993–94, with a marginal decline in the population engaged 
in agriculture from 71% in 1931 to only 65% (Shah et al. 1998). The ‘big push’ for 
agricultural development was a delayed effort up to the late 1960s with the launching of 
the Intensive Agriculture Development Program (IADP – “Green Revolution”) only after 
the shock of a decline in food production due to the failure of monsoons in 1965 and 
1967. The strategy, however, was concentrated in the irrigated areas in selected regions 
of India; efficiency was given more importance than the equity aspects of the 
intervention. Commenting on the IADP, Chakravarty (1987, p. 27) stated that “Land 
reform was considered very important, at least in principle, in practice the issue was 
largely evaded. . . . It was also openly admitted that it was essential to bet on the strong.” 
This did not prevent the State to legislate one of the largest body of land reform acts in a 
short period of time (see Thorner 1976); however, the major problems have been the 
unenthusiastic implementation of the legislation except in the states of Kerala and West 
Bengal where leftist governments have been in power for a greater period of time. A 
recent study using state level data for sixteen states shows that land reforms have led to 
poverty reduction and the evidence shows that “this is primarily due to land reforms that 
challenge the terms of land contracts rather than redistributing land” (Besley and Burgess 
1998).
 This study revisits the land size-productivity relationship debate and provides new 
empirical evidence of the inverse relationship in owner-operated and share cropper-
operated farms in Vidisha district, Madhya Pradesh, India. Share cropping is a form of 
land tenancy in which the landlord allows the tenant to use the land in return for a 
stipulated fraction of the output. The importance of understanding the relationship 
between land size and productivity (across various ownership groups) remains important 
even today. In India, the average size of land holdings in 1990–91 was 1.57 ha while the 
average operated area was only 0.19 ha (Singh and Singh 1999). A survey published by 
the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) estimates that the arable land per capita 
would go down to 0.09 ha in 2025. The input decisions and the resultant output at various 
land sizes needs to be understood for an effective strategy of growth in crop production 
and productivity to achieve self-sufficiency and compete in a liberalized trade regime. 
The study intends to contribute to this understanding by undertaking a micro-level study 
An Open Access Journal published by ICRISAT
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
SAT eJournal | ejournal.icrisat.org                                                                                                   August 2006 | Volume 2 | Issue 1
3of farming households who cultivated soybean in the 1999 rainy season in Vidisha 
district of Madhya Pradesh. 
Objectives
The objectives of this study are to: 
(i) Understand the relationship between land size (and various input variables) and 
soybean productivity among owner-operated and share cropper-operated farms. 
(ii) Examine the profitability for owner-operated farmers, landlords, and share 
croppers.
(iii) Suggest policy intervention and intervention strategies for the Government of 
Madhya Pradesh and the stakeholders. 
Methodology
Primary data was collected (in October and November 2000) from farmers and share 
croppers using an interview schedule for the 1999 rainy season soybean crop. Additional 
data has been collected from the Agriculture Officer, BAIF, Lateri Watershed in Vidisha 
district. The villages Jaoti, Kherkhedi, and Kundhankhedi were chosen through purposive 
sampling to contain both owner-operated farms and share croppers who cultivate soybean 
(Table 1). The respondents were selected through random sampling. The selected villages 
belong to  Zone 9 according to the ICRISAT typology (ICRISAT 1999). The data has 
been analyzed by studying the relationship between various variables using the Karl 
Pearson correlation coefficient technique. In addition to the data in Table 1, information 
on the crop yields from 13 ICRISAT trial farmers in Lalatora village has been used for a 
comparative analysis. 
Table 1. Details of sample for the study in Madhya Pradesh, India.
Village Owner-operated farms Share croppers Total 
Jaoti 18 20 38 
Kherkhedi 12 13 25 
Kundhankhedi 9 4 13 
   Total 39 37 76 
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4Review of literature 
The discussion on the inverse relationship between land size and productivity in 
agriculture could be traced back to the work of Chaynov (1966) who examined data of 
Russian agriculture for the 1920s and 1930s. In India the identification of the relationship 
came after the analysis of the data on Farm Management Surveys in the mid-1970s 
(Bhagwathi and Chakravarty 1969, Saini 1969, Bharadwaj 1974).  
 It was observed that small farms on an average employed more input (per unit area) 
and as a result had a higher output. The debate was initiated by Sen (1966) who argued 
that if the market wage rate is imputed to family labor, many of the farms would show 
losses and profitability increases with the size of the holdings. Sen (1966, 1975) provides 
an explanation in his theory of ‘agricultural dualism’ where the traditional small peasant 
is assumed to be well endowed with plentiful labor with low or zero opportunity cost 
while facing a severe constraint on credit. It was argued that these farms would employ 
labor up to the point of zero marginal productivity. Large farms, however, would employ 
labor up to the point where the wage rate equalled the marginal product. This could 
explain declining productivity in terms of output (per unit area) but increasing 
profitability. Srinivasan (1973) argued that if farmers are maximizing the expected utility 
of their income (and if they are risk averse), then it is optimal for small farms to employ 
more inputs (per unit area). The major reason for under-investment is the risk-averse 
behavior of the farmers, the variability of the monsoons being a major factor. 
Rosenzweig and  Binswanger (1993) using ICRISAT data provide evidence to show that 
wealthier farmers are more likely to undertake riskier investments due to their ex-post 
consumption smoothing mechanism, whereas poorer farmers would not take that risk, 
even if they would have to be satisfied with lower but stable incomes. 
 The serious questioning of the inverse relationship has come from the proponents 
who argue that the quality of the land is the reason. The studies have noted that 
adjustment for land quality diminishes the inverse relationship (Khursro 1964, Sen 1975, 
Bliss and Stern 1982) and it is argued that the inverse relationship is a spurious result 
caused by the bias due to the omission of land quality in regressions (Bhalla and Roy 
1988).
 The efficiency of share cropping has been a long debated issue and one of the earliest 
advocates of the inefficiency hypothesis was Adam Smith. Smith (1776) argued that it 
was not in the interest of the share croppers to improve the productivity of the land as he 
got only one tenth of the product. He favored fixed rent contracts and was concerned with 
the insecurity of the farmers because of the expiration of the lease. He advocated “the law 
which secures the longest lease against successors of every kind”. Commenting on the 
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5metyayers (share croppers), Arthur Young who was secretary to the Board of Agriculture 
in England said: 
“There is not one word to be said in favour of the practice, and a thousand 
arguments that might be used against it. . . . In this most miserable of all 
the modes of letting land, the defrauded landlord receives a contemptible 
rent; the farmer is in the lowest state of poverty; the land is miserably 
cultivated; and the nation suffers as severely as the parties themselves. . . . 
Wherever this system prevails, it may be taken for granted that a useless 
and miserable population is found.” (Edwards 1892, pp. 202?203)
 Marshall argued that share cropping leads to a Pareto-inefficient allocation of labor. 
The rental share paid to the landlord was tantamount to an excise tax on the share 
cropper’s effort and this would induce the share cropper to reduce his output below the 
wage level where the marginal product of the share cropping is equal to the wage level. 
This under provision of inputs by the share cropper has been characterized as 
“Marshallian inefficiency” in the literature. The Marshallian tradition was built on the 
implicit assumption that the share contract refers to only one variable; however, as 
pointed out by Cheung (1969) a contract need not contain only one variable. Cheung 
(1969) argues that many real world contracts (drawing evidence from Taiwan) specify 
such items as the amount of land to be cultivated, non-labor inputs to be supplied, etc., in 
addition to the rental share. If the labor intensity of the share cropped land is less than 
under wage cultivation, the landlord can earn higher rental income either by self 
cultivation (through hired labor) or by fixed rental tenancy. 
 On the other hand, if the landlord insists on a higher labor intensity on the share 
cropped land there would not be any tenant available for share cropping. Therefore, the 
optimum would require the labor intensity on the share cropped land should be such that 
the marginal product of labor is equal to the wage level and the rent per unit is equal to 
the marginal product. This idealistic and artificial analysis has been critiqued. Jaynes 
(1982) has rightly argued that “The tenant representation in this process is superfluous. 
Tenants make no real choices as to labor supply, but simply choose the various all or 
nothing offers made unilaterally by landlords . . .  The role of wage in Cheung’s analysis 
is just to ensure efficiency. The model is adhoc.” 
 Bardhan and Srinivasan (1971) were the first to extend the conventional unilateral 
maximization approach to a general equilibrium approach. They allow both the landlord 
and the tenant to influence in determination of the share rental value while retaining the 
perfectly competitive labor market assumption of Cheung and Marshall. The share-tenant 
in the model has the option of leasing in land to cultivate with his own labor or working 
as a wage labor in some alternative employment. The tenant is assumed to maximize his 
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6utility in terms of income and leisure. On the supply side, the landlord has the option of 
cultivating his own land or renting it out to the share cropper. The landlord like the tenant 
is assumed to maximize his utility, which is defined in terms of income and leisure. 
Combining the demand and supply functions so derived they go on to determine the 
competitive share-rental rate. 
 Bhaduri’s (1973) contribution has been a significant one in which he shows that a 
landlord who is a provider of consumption loans to his tenant may have no incentive to 
adopt yield-increasing innovations, if the landlord’s interest from his loans to the tenant 
does not go down (because the tenant will borrow less as he shares the increased yield). 
This proposition has been critiqued by Newberry (1974), Ghose and Saith (1976), and 
Srinivasan (1979) that it is a weak constraint on adoption of technical progress and it is 
argued that if the landlord has sufficient power to exploit his tenant-borrower and to 
withhold the innovation, then he ought to have sufficient power to gain from the 
innovation.
 An income maximizing landlord will always prefer to self-cultivate rather than 
employ a share cropper (to escape from Marshallian inefficiency). A modification of the 
Marshallian tradition is provided by Lucas (1979) who presents a joint optimizing system 
which is differentiated from others by the feature that wage labor requires monitoring in 
order to extract full effort. Landlords may prefer share tenancy contracts because in these 
contracts workers have an incentive to work harder even without supervision. The cost is 
the monitoring cost for the landlord and for the tenant it is the share tax on the extra 
output produced. The study found that mixed wage and share tenancy contracts along 
with share tenancy contracts provides higher social welfare than a wage only contract. 
 Share cropping is seen as a risk between the landlord and the tenant. Newberry and 
Stiglitz (1979) have developed an approach drawing on insights from the capital market. 
Each leasing agreement (share cropping or renting) or self-cultivation is viewed as an 
asset with specific risk and return characteristics. The landlord’s problem is to allocate 
his land between the assets in such a way as to maximize his expected income. The 
analysis of the study indicated that incorporating uncertainty provides little rationale for 
share cropping. It is argued that the mixture of rental and wage agreements provides 
exactly the same income as share cropping. 
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7Role of tenancy in imperfect rural markets 
Tenancy as a mechanism for resource adjustment    
Tenancy is a contractual system that enables rural households to adjust their resources, 
particularly land in relation to their endowment labor and draft power. Thus rural 
households may find that they are better of in leasing land than seeking wage 
employment given the limited and uncertain job opportunities in rural areas. Conversely, 
where labor is scarce, especially during peak seasons, landowners may prefer to lease out 
land rather than depend on an uncertain supply of labor. 
Tenancy and incentives  
The argument that tenants have a greater incentive to work than wage laborers is rooted 
in classical economics in the writings of Adam Smith, J S Mill, and Marshall. Smith 
argued that in Europe share-tenancy succeeded serfdom which itself gave way to fixed 
rent tenancy. 
Tenancy as a credit system 
In developing countries like India where markets for capital and credit are 
underdeveloped, the only way a person may have access to these resources is to enter into 
a tenancy contract. This is one of the main incentives in rural India where consumption 
loans and provision of goods in kind is strong incentive. Braverman and Stiglitz (1980) 
have argued that there are good reasons for this arrangement as it lowers the cost of credit 
to the tenant and enables the landlord to monitor the tenant’s effort. Landlords also 
provide credit to the tenants by supplying them inputs, with the tenant’s contractual share 
of the costs being subtracted from his/her share of the output after the harvest. 
Tenancy, risk, and entrepreneurship   
Agricultural production and its returns are risky and have an important bearing on the 
contractual system which in turn has a differential effect on the landlord and the share 
cropper. Cheung (1969) was the first to put forward the hypothesis that the choice 
between different forms of land tenure arrangements was likely to be affected by the 
parties’ risk aversion under uncertainty. 
 Tenancy contracts do provide an incentive for effective realization of the 
entrepreneurial abilities provided the contractual terms are favorable. Rao (1971) noted 
that share cropping seemed more prevalent in India where crops provided little scope for 
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8decision making by tenants, whereas fixed rent contracts were most often needed when 
more decision making was required. Also in South India, share cropping dominated the 
rice-producing areas with assured irrigation, while fixed rents prevailed in tobacco-
growing areas. In the tobacco-growing areas the small holders tended to lease out to large 
holders. Newberry (1975) suggested that fixed rent contracts might be preferred for crops 
requiring entrepreneurial skills where (i) landlords were more risk averse than the 
tenants; (ii) tenants had special skills that they did not wish to share with landlords; or 
(iii) landlords faced the problem of ‘moral hazard’ that they could not determine whether 
shortfalls in output were the tenant’s fault. 
Efficiency of share cropping 
Rao (1971) (with evidence from Andhra Pradesh) and Chakravarty and Rudra (1973) 
(with evidence from five Indian districts) concluded that the behavior of share croppers is 
basically not different from that of owners. The following studies have reported the 
Marshallian proposition of higher input and output intensities per unit on owned land 
relative to share cropped land: Bell (1977) with data from Northeast India, 
Chattopadhyay (1979) from West Bengal, and Shahban (1987) with evidence from 
8 districts in India. Bliss and Stern (1982) have reported mixed evidence in an intensive 
study in Palanpur, Uttar Pradesh. The study found no major differences in crop yields 
between share croppers and owner-operated farms. Shahban (1987) compared the yield 
obtained by share croppers on their own land vis-à-vis leased land from eight ICRISAT 
study villages in Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Gujarat. The main empirical findings 
of the study are: (i) output and input intensities are higher on the owned plots of a mixed 
share cropper compared with the share cropped plots; (ii) the differences in irrigation 
across tenure status is important in explaining a large fraction of the input and output 
differences while soil quality variations are not; (iii) when the variation in irrigation, plot 
value, and soil quality is controlled, no systematic differences between the plots that are 
owned and those rented could be detected. The study, therefore, argues that sizeable 
differences in share croppers are caused by the form of contractual arrangements and not 
tenancy per se. 
Soybean production and productivity in India 
The post-independence strategy of agricultural development laid a greater emphasis on 
attaining self-sufficiency in cereals and support in terms of technological and institutional 
inputs were directed towards it. In this process, pulses, the major source of protein and 
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9edible oil, remained neglected and the country relied on imports to bridge the shortfall in 
pulses production. The “Yellow Revolution” associated with the quick spread of oilseeds 
since the 1980s took root in the less irrigated areas of low and erratic rainfall in the semi-
arid tropics (SAT) of India. In the mid-1980s, India was importing 30% of its 
requirement of edible oils bringing a strain on the balance of payment account. The 
Technology Mission on Oilseeds was launched in May 1986 and this resulted in a gradual 
but steady rise in the domestic market prices of oilseeds as imports of oilseeds were 
restricted. This trend was further accentuated in January 1989 when the National Dairy 
Development Board, serving as the apex agency for oilseeds, was set up. During this 
period about 7 million ha of additional area came under oilseeds; this area was partly 
from rainy season fallow, partly through crop intensification, and a substantial part 
through crop substitution. The shift was largely from coarse cereals, but in some pockets 
even pulses and wheat were replaced with oilseeds (Gulati and Kelly 1999).
 In India the oilseeds sector accounts for 19% of the total global area and 9% of the 
production; however, the productivity is only 0.93 t ha
-1
 as compared to the world level 
of 1.63 t ha
-1
. Oilseeds form the second largest commodity after cereals in India, 
accounting for 14% of the country’s gross cropped area, nearly 5% of the gross net 
production, and 10% of the value of all agricultural products. Fourteen million people are 
involved in the production of oilseeds and one million in processing (Hegde 2000). 
 Given the deficit in pulses as well as edible oils, soybean assumes great significance 
as it contains about 45% protein and 18% oil. Though soybean (black) is traditionally 
grown on the foothills of the Himalayas, Kumaon, and Garwahal regions of Uttar Pradesh 
and some scattered pockets in central India, the awareness about soybean, the 
exploitation of its commercial potential, and the introduction of yellow soybean is of 
recent origin starting with research at experimental stations in the mid-1960s. The 
prospects of promoting black soybean cultivated traditionally in some parts of India were 
low due to its low yield, color, hard seed coat, and lack of market. Soybean seeds were 
introduced from USA and tested between 1963 and 1965 at the Indian Agricultural 
Research Institute (IARI) in New Delhi, and at Pantnagar and Jabalpur. The University of 
Illinois, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and Indian 
Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) collaborated in this effort. Experiments 
suggested that a varietal breakthrough of local conditions might be achieved and the All 
India Coordinated Research Project on Soybean sponsored by ICAR was initiated in 1967 
with its headquarters in Pantnagar. There are 19 centers involved in the project in 
different agroclimatic regions. 
 India’s share in the world soybean production in 1998–99 was 5.2%, with production 
of 6.94 million t out of the total world production of 159.85 million t (Table 2). The 
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productivity of soybean in India in the 1970s and 1980s varied from 0.54 to 0.75 t ha
-1
and increased up to 1.12 t ha
-1
 in 1997–98 (Table 3). Seventy percent of India’s soybean 
is produced in Madhya Pradesh from the gross cropped area of 7.6 million ha. The 
average yield for Madhya Pradesh varies from 0.81 to 1.06 t ha
-1
.  ICRISAT (1999) 
estimated  the productivity of soybean for different zones in India. The data given below 
are the averages of the triennium ending 1993:  
Zone 3 (Irrigated wheat zone of central Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh) :1.02 t ha
-1
Zone 8 (Rainfed wheat-chickpea zone of  central Madhya Pradesh : 0.81 t ha
-1
Zone 9 (Soybean dominant zone of  western Madhya Pradesh) : 1.06 t ha
-1
Zone 10 (Rainy season sorghum-cotton system of western Maharashtra 
 and parts of Madhya Pradesh) : 0.96 t ha
-1
Table 2. Soybean production and yield in the world.
Country
Production (1999–2000) 
(million t) Yield (t ha
-1
)
USA  71.93 2.45 
Brazil  31.40 2.36 
Argentina  20.70 2.42 
China  14.29 1.75 
Paraguay  2.90 2.52 
European Union  1.14 3.12 
India
1
  6.94 1.10 
1. Estimates for 1998–99 (Source: Agricultural Situation in India). 
Source: USDA (2000).
Table 3. Soybean production in India from 1993 to 1999.
Year
Area
(million ha) 
Production
(million t) 
Yield
(t ha
-1
)
1993–94 4.2 4.2 1.08 
1994–95 4.0 3.7 0.91 
1995–96 4.9 5.0 1.02 
1996–97 5.3 5.1 0.99 
1997–98 5.8 6.5 1.12 
1998–99
1
 6.3 6.9 1.10 
1. Estimates. 
Source:  Agricultural Situation in India (various issues).
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Soybean under a liberalized trade regime 
India signed the Uruguay Round Agreement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) vested in the World Trade Organization which makes it mandatory for 
member countries to gradually open their agriculture to world markets.  
Market access 
Under market access commitments, all member countries of the GATT are required to 
(i) replace all types of non-tariff barriers with tariff barriers; and (ii) reduce the level of 
tariffs under a time bound program (these levels are to be reduced by 24% for developing 
countries). The period within which these restrictions are to be taken up varies from six 
years in developed countries to ten years in developing countries. 
Aggregate measure of support 
The aggregate measure of support (AMS) is the annual aggregate value of market price 
support, non-exempt direct payments, and any other subsidy not exempted from the 
reduction commitments expressed in monetary terms. If the product specific and non-
product specific exceeds 10% of the total value of agricultural production, it is to be 
reduced by 13.3% of the value that does not qualify for exemption during the 
implementation period. India has basically two types of support for farmers: (i) market 
price support, which is in the form of minimum support prices, announced by the 
Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices; (ii) input subsidies on inputs such as 
fertilizers, irrigation, credit, and seeds. The calculations for India shows that AMS for 17 
major commodities including soybean is negative. This negative support (or net taxation) 
is due to the fact that prices of different crops are fixed by the government below 
international levels. 
Export competition 
The GATT agreement calls for reducing export subsidies by 24% from their 1986–88 
level in developing countries over a period of ten years. The quantity of subsidized export 
is to be reduced by 14%. 
Domestic policy on liberalization 
In February 1995 almost all edible oils (except coconut oil) have been put under the Open 
General License (OGL) with an import duty of 30%. In July 1996 it was reduced to 20% 
and in July 1998 the effective duty on edible oils was 15%. Under the market access 
clause, members are required to convert non-tariff barriers and submit ceiling tariff 
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bindings for all commodities. For oilseeds in general the government committed a 
maximum tariff rate of 100% although the prevailing rate in April 1996 was 40–50% in 
order to protect the oilseeds sector. 
 ICRISAT (1999) projected the resource cost ratio (RCR) and the profitability rates of 
soybean (Table 4). The RCR was calculated from the domestic resource cost (DRC). 
DRC is defined as the value of domestic resources needed to save a unit of foreign 
exchange.
RCR = DRC/Shadow Exchange Rate  
Table 4. Resource cost ratio (RCR) and profitability of soybean under a liberalized 
trade regime.
Land RCR 
Private profit
(Rs. ha
-1
)
Social profit
(Rs. ha
-1
)
Subsidies
(Rs. ha
-1
)
Irrigated 1.07 4389 –1129 2091 
Rainfed 0.98 6390     230 903 
   Average 0.99 6150   –109  
Source: ICRISAT (1999).
 The RCR for irrigated soybean is 1.07, which means the country has to spend 
Rs. 1.07 to save Rs. 1.00 of foreign exchange whereas for rainfed soybean, the country 
has to spend Rs. 0.98 to save Rs. 1.00 of foreign exchange. The private profit is also 
higher with a positive social profit (due to lesser subsidies). The cost of subsidies of 
irrigated soybean is Rs. 2091 ha
-1 
in comparison with only Rs. 903 ha
-1 
for rainfed 
soybean (Table 4). If all subsidies were abolished, the profitability of irrigated soybean 
will suffer by 48% and induce a shift away from the crop under irrigated conditions. 
 Therefore, the policy implication is quite clear that research priority should be given 
to rainfed soybean and attempts should be made to bring an increase in area of rainy 
season fallow under soybean or the replaceable crops of cotton, sorghum, or maize. 
Study area 
Madhya Pradesh is the largest state in India, spread over an area of 443,446 km
2
 (13.5% 
of the total area of the country; data predates the formation of Chattisgarh state). The total 
population of Madhya Pradesh was 66.14 million in 1991, accounting for 7.8% of India’s 
population. The state comprises 14.6% of scheduled castes and 22.3% of scheduled 
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tribes. Ninety percent of the rural population is engaged in agriculture, 52% of the main 
working population in the state are cultivators, and 23.5% are landless laborers (TARU 
1999). The Planning Commission estimated that in 1995, 42.5% of the state’s population 
lived below the poverty line with the national average at 33.5% (Government of Madhya 
Pradesh 1998). However, it is estimated that in Vidisha district, the poverty head count 
ratio is below 10%. According to the Ninth Five Year Plan, per capita income in Madhya 
Pradesh was Rs. 6,597 as against the national average of Rs. 9,321. Although 90% of the 
rural population is engaged in agriculture, the contribution of the primary sector to the 
state domestic product is only 43% with 25% from secondary sector and 32% from 
tertiary sector. 
Vidisha district 
Vidisha district is ranked 30
th
 in the Human Development Index (HDI), 1998 out of 45 
districts in Madhya Pradesh, with a HDI of 0.481 and ranked 37
th
 in the Gender 
Development Index (GDI) with GDI of 0.523. About 1.5% of Madhya Pradesh’s 
population lives in Vidisha district with a population of 20.3% of scheduled caste and 
4.4% of scheduled tribe. Literacy is 58% in males and 27.8% in females (Government of 
Madhya Pradesh 1998). The Gini coefficient of operational holding is 0.555. 
 Irrigated area is 71,900 ha while the unirrigated area is 4,448,800 ha. The average 
fertilizer consumption is 29.9 kg ha
-1
. The land ownership in the district is: wholly owned 
area, 0.9%; wholly leased in holdings, 63.1%; and wholly otherwise operated area, 31.2% 
(Government of Madhya Pradesh 1998). The definition of ‘wholly otherwise operated’ is 
not mentioned and it is hypothesized that this refers to land cultivated on government and 
common lands illegally. Also, lands operated by households above the land ceiling act is 
included in this category. 
Intervention of ICRISAT and BAIF 
The intervention of ICRISAT in Lalatora micro-watershed in the 1999 rainy season is 
part of a larger project titled “Improving Management of Natural Resources for 
Sustainable Rainfed Agriculture” funded by the ADB. The participating member 
countries of the project are India, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
 The objectives of the project are to: (i) increase the productivity and sustainability of 
the medium and high water-holding capacity soils in the intermediate rainfall ecoregion; 
and (ii) develop environment-friendly resource management practices that will conserve 
soil and water resources. The project focuses on the intermediate rainfall ecozone in 
central India, northeastern Thailand, and northern Vietnam where the annual rainfall is 
about 800–1300 mm and where soils have a relatively high water-holding capacity. 
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 The rationale for the interventions is due to the temporal variability in amount and 
distribution of rainfall (which creates highly uncertain agricultural environment), which 
results in food insecurity of poor farmers in SAT and discourages them to make 
productive investment in agriculture. The “cycle of unsustained agriculture and soil 
degradation in the Asian tropics can be stalled by the application of low-cost scientific 
rainfed agriculture” (ICRISAT website: www.icrisat.org/nrmp/). The project aims at 
intensification of crop production in the target environments through efficient use of 
natural resources including efficient water use so that rainfall use efficiency for crop 
production is increased and land degradation is minimized.  
 The intermediate rainfall zone in Asia receives rainfall between 800 mm and 1300 
mm annually and has black soils (Vertisols, associated soils, and Alfisols). The main 
crops in the region are rainfed cash crops such as soybean, cotton, and groundnut in 
addition to food crops such as mung bean, maize, pigeonpea, and sorghum. In India, 72 
million ha is covered by Vertisols and associated soils. The area under soybean has 
increased from 3% to 5% annually over the last 10–15 years due to the greater 
profitability of the crop and in 1999, 5.8 million ha was under the crop as compared to 
10,000 ha in 1981. The potential simulated analysis of potential yields of soybean ranges 
from 2.3 t ha
-1 
in Bhopal to 4.3 t ha
-1
 in Raisen district (ICRISAT 2000) as against the 
current productivity level of 0.94 t ha
-1
 in India. The project intends to achieve increased 
production of soybean that might brighten the prospects of export of soybean and bring 
down the import of edible oils and pulses (ICRISAT 2000). 
 BAIF, a non-governmental organization (NGO) is working in the Lateri Watershed 
area, Lateri Block, Vidisha district. The average rainfall in the area is 1020 mm. The soil 
in this area is medium to deep black. The Lateri Milli watershed in Vidisha district 
comprises an area of 7900 ha in 11 micro-watersheds covering 25 villages. In the rainy 
season the cropping pattern in the area as reported by the implementing agency BAIF is: 
soybean, 54.8%;  fodder (grass), 19.8%; small millets, 20.8%; maize, 4.0%; and others, 
0.6%.
 The Rajiv Gandhi Watershed Mission of the Government of Madhya Pradesh funds 
the watershed program. The program comprises 11 micro-watersheds covering 15 
villages. The project was initiated in November 1997 with a total estimated cost of Rs. 
42.3 million rupees covering 7900 ha. A total area of 3693 ha (government land, 2395 ha; 
private land, 1298 ha) was treated for soil and water conservation until 21 July 2000. 
Plantation work has been undertaken in 0.33 ha of government land and 57 ha of private 
land, while fuel wood plantation has been undertaken in 1300 ha of government land and 
47 ha of private land.
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 Jaoti (800 households), Kherkhedi (200 households), and Kundhankhedi (13 
households) were selected as the sample villages. These villages are connected by road to 
the nearest market place, Anandpur. The villages are electrified except for a part of 
Kherkhedi village. Although schools are prevalent in Jaoti and Kherkhedi villages, the 
drop out rate for both the boys and girls is high. The nearest banks are the Land 
Development Bank and the Cooperative Bank in Anandpur village, which lends to 
farmers with the collateral of the land documents. A small river flows near Kherkhedi 
village. Jaoti village has a pond, whose desiltation from the watershed program has 
helped in the recharge of groundwater. The nearest hospital is in Lalatora village, which 
is run by the Sadguru Seva Trust. Child marriage is prevalent in the area. Incidence of 
tuberculosis is high, especially among young women, who give birth at an early age, 
become anemic and are prone to tuberculosis. The villages are located in the radius of 25 
km from Lateri Block of Vidisha district, which is 150 km away from the state capital, 
Bhopal (Fig. 1). 
Figure 1. Map of Vidisha district, Madhya Pradesh, India. 
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 A total of 46 SHGs have been initiated with 380 members. In Jaoti, there is one SHG 
with three male members and another group of women also comprising three members. 
In Kherkhedi, there are two male SHGs comprising 19 members and two women’s 
groups comprising 21 members. No group has been formed in Kundhankhedi. There 
is scope for improving the functioning of the SHGs which are not functioning to the 
desired levels. The patriarchal society and the prevalence of the ‘purdah’ system among 
the women inhibits the free interaction of women in society and is a major constraint 
faced by any intervention strategy. 
Cost of cultivation 
The concept of productivity used in this study refers to yield per hectare. The cost of 
cultivation of soybean is as follows: 
? Land preparation cost - The cost of hiring a tractor is Rs. 200 h-1.
? Seed cost - Rs. 12 kg-1.
? Diammonium phosphate (DAP) - Rs. 10 kg-1.
? Single superphosphate - Rs. 2.70  kg-1.
? Average wage rates (per day) prevalent in the village: 
? Sowing - Rs. 40. 
? Weeding - Rs. 40 to Rs. 50. 
? Harvesting - Rs. 50 (up to Rs. 75 in peak demand). 
? The imputed labor costs of the landlord (share cropper is not computed in calculating 
the costs).  
? The cost of threshing is Rs. 3 to 5 for 100 kg of threshed soybean. 
ICRISAT provided technical support through the NGO during the first year and 
recommended best bet option treatment to trial farmers. The best bet option includes: 
? Thiram:bavistin - 1:2 ratio. Thiram and bavistin seed treatment (at 3 g kg-1 seed) 
helps in healthy crop stand. 
? Rhizobium - 1.25 kg ha-1.
? Phosphate solubilizing bacteria - 1.25 kg ha-1.
? Murriate of potash - 50 kg ha-1.
? Urea - 50 kg ha-1.
? DAP - 125 kg ha-1.
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Owner-operated farms 
The study of owner-operated farms involved the collection of primary data from 39 
farmers in the villages of Jaoti (Middle Zone of the watershed), Kherkhedi (Lower Zone), 
and Kundhankhedi (Middle Zone) (Table 5). The data collected by the BAIF Agriculture 
Officer on the yield of 13 ICRISAT trial farmers from Lalatora village (Lower Zone) was 
also used to compare the yield between the trial and non-trial farmers in other villages. 
Table 5. Land holding of soybean owner-operated farms.
Village Sample size 
Dryland
(ha)
Irrigable land 
(ha)
Total
(ha)
Jaoti  18  68.06 30.62  98.68 
Kherkhedi  12  47.50 33.99  81.49 
Kundhankhedi  9   57.00 20.25  77.25 
   Total  39  172.56 84.86  257.42 
Land utilization 
The rainy season sown area in Jaoti, Kherkhedi, and Kundhankhedi consisted 
predominantly of irrigable land signifying that the soybean crop is predominantly grown 
on irrigable land and lands without irrigation facilities are kept for growing the postrainy 
season crop. The percentage of total area that is uncultivated in rainy season is 71.85% 
which is predominantly dryland (Table 6). Although Vidisha district has an average 
rainfall of 1200 mm which seemingly is “assured rainfall”, the variation during the crop 
cycle is an important factor. Foster et al. (1987) stated that the main problem during rainy 
season in Begumgunj village in Madhya Pradesh is erratic rainfall. Although total annual 
rainfall is adequate compared to other semi-arid tropical areas, the pattern of onset, 
cessation, and distribution within the season is unpredictable and creates high risk of crop 
failure. 
 The dryland farmers in the study villages do not prefer to cultivate the land in the 
rainy season and instead prefer to lease-out to share croppers, as in Jaoti village. This has 
important implications as the farmers prefer to grow soybean in irrigable area. The 
intervention strategy to reach out to dryland farmers who leave the land uncultivated in 
the rainy season needs to be considered seriously. The major reason stated by the farmers 
for leaving the land fallow is that growing soybean would delay the cultivation of the 
postrainy season crop which is a more assured crop for the dryland farmers.  
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Therefore, there is a need to promote short-duration varieties so that the farmer has a 
better incentive and is at a lesser risk when he attempts to cultivate soybean in the 
dryland. Waterlogging is another constraint which strengthens the risk-aversive behavior 
of the dryland farmer (excess rains during the 1999 rainy season caused waterlogging). 
Broad-bed and furrow (BBF) technique needs to be supplemented with an overall 
intervention for improving the drainage system in the watershed. 
Productivity 
The average productivity among the 39 farmers is 0.72 t ha
-1
 which varies from 0.66 
t ha
-1
 to 0.78 t ha
-1
 in the three villages in comparison to ICRISAT trial farmers who 
obtain an average productivity of 1.1 t ha
-1
 (Table 7). The productivity obtained by 
farmers from the other villages ranges from 0.12 t ha
-1
 to 2.40 t ha
-1
 (see Tables 8 and 9 
for input intensity of highest and lowest productive farms). The average land operated 
size is 2.11 ha. 
 The highest yield obtained by the farmer in Jaoti in 0.5 ha of irrigable land, involved 
no input of fertilizers (compared to the average of 46 kg ha
-1
) with cost of cultivation of 
Rs. 5432 ha
-1
 (against the average of Rs. 3100 ha
-1
). The labor input was 136 days ha
-1
 of 
which 70% comprised of own labor which was highest among all owner-operated 
farmers. In comparison the lowest yield of 0.12 t ha
-1 
sown in 0.25 ha of irrigable land 
involved application of 15 kg of DAP with no weeding undertaken and with cost of 
cultivation of Rs. 3044 ha
-1
. The labor input was 54 person-days, which was entirely of 
the farmer and his family. The yields obtained by three farmers who utilized farmyard 
manure (FYM) are given in Table 10. 
Table 6. Land utilization and output of soybean owner-operated farms.
Village
Sown area 
(ha)
% of sown 
area irrigable
% of total area 
uncultivated
Production
(t)
Gross output
(Rs.)
Jaoti 31.22 98.07 67.46 24.2 178811 
Kherkhedi 21.24 92.93 73.93 15.1 112355 
Kundhankhedi 20.00 98.76 73.78 13.3 106375 
Total 72.46 - - 52.6 397541 
Average  96.58 71.85   
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Table 7. Yield and profit of soybean owner-operated farms.
Village
Cost of 
cultivation
(Rs. ha
-1
)
Yield
(t ha
-1
)
Benefit-
cost ratio 
Profit 
(Rs. ha
-1
)
Loss
making 
farmers 
Loss
amount 
(Rs)
Jaoti 3100 0.78 1.86 2636 2 3017 
Kherkhedi 4035 0.71 1.31 2166 3 2595 
Kundhankhedi 3285 0.66 1.84 2444 0 0 
   Average 3320 0.72 1.63 2045   
   Total     5 5612 
Table 8. Input intensity of five high productivity owner-operated soybean farms. 
Labor (person-days ha-1)
Village 
Yield
(t ha-1) Own Hired Total 
% of own 
labor in total 
labor 
% of hired 
labor in total 
labor 
Land size 
(ha) 
Jaoti 2.40 136 58 194  70 30 0.50 
Kherkhedi 2.00  56  0  56 100  0 0.25 
Jaoti 1.94 122 97 219  56 44 0.62 
Jaoti 1.34  41 32  73  86 14 0.50 
Kherkhedi 1.20  77 0  77 100  0 0.75 
Table 9. Input intensity of five low productivity owner-operated soybean farms. 
Labor (person-days ha-1)
Village 
Yield
(t ha-1) Own Hired Total 
% of own 
labor in total 
labor 
% of hired 
labor in total 
labor 
Land size 
(ha) 
Kherkhedi 0.12 52 0 52 100 0.00 0.25 
Jaoti 0.36 28 0 28 100 0.00 0.25 
Kherkhedi 0.40 8 20 28 20 28.57 2.50 
Jaoti 0.46 7 5 12 57 43.00 8.75 
Kherkhedi 0.50 0 48 48 0 100.00 5.00 
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Table 10. Yield of soybean obtained by farmers who used farmyard manure 
(FYM).
Village
Area
(ha)
FYM
(t)
Yield
(t ha
-1
)
Jaoti 0.25 0.96 1.20 
Kherkhedi 0.62 0.64 0.56 
Kundhankhedi 0.25 1.00 2.00 
Land size productivity relationship 
The relationship is found to be inverse with the overall r of –0.27 and the r for Jaoti and 
Kherkhedi being –0.27 and –0.38 respectively; however, in Kundhankhedi village the 
correlation was found positive at 0.27 (see Figures 2, 3, and 4). Among ICRISAT trial 
farmers the relationship has been found inverse and the r at –0.36. 
Fertilizers and labor inputs 
The relationship between land size and fertilizer usage is positively correlated but is not 
significant at 0.17. The correlation for the three villages Jaoti, Kherkhedi, and 
Kundhankhedi is 0.22, 0.08, and 0.30 respectively (Table 11). 
Table 11. Correlation between land size and variables in soybean owner-operated 
farms.
Village Fertilizer use 
Total labor 
input
Hired labor 
input Yield 
Jaoti 0.22 –0.45 –0.17 –0.27 
Kherkhedi 0.08 –0.32 0.92 –0.38 
Kundhankhedi 0.30   0.30 0.58  0.27 
Average 0.17 –0.37    0.44 –0.26 
Labor
The relationship between land size and labor invested in cultivation of a hectare of land is 
found to be inversely related with the correlation being –0.37. The correlation for Jaoti 
and Kherkhedi is –0.45 and  –0.32 respectively. However, for Kundhankhedi the relation 
is positive at 0.30, but not significant (Table 11). 
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 The productivity of the five highest productive farms in Jaoti involved an average 
labor input of 130.8 person-days ha
-1
 (own labor 63.45%), compared to 21.89 person-
days ha
-1
 among the five lowest productive farms of which 90.93% comprised own labor. 
The productivity of the five highest productive farms in Kherkhedi involved an average 
labor input of 85.57 person-days ha
-1
 of which 90.26% consisted of own labor. The 
average labor input of the five lowest productive farms involved an average of 17.15 
person-days ha
-1 
of which 56.41% consisted of own labor. The productivity of the two 
highest productive farms in Kundhankhedi involved input of 43 and 36 person-days ha
-1
compared to 19 and 21 person-days ha
-1
 for the lowest productive farms. 
 The rationale for the farmers to underinvest inputs is due to the variability of an 
important variable, i.e., rainfall. In the 1999 rainy season the problem was excess rainfall, 
particularly during the sowing period. The farmers reported that it rained continuously for 
two days around June 20, 1999. An important determining factor, therefore, was the slope 
and drainage of the land in escaping from waterlogging. The risk-averse farmer therefore 
consciously underinvests his inputs to minimize the risk. Among the sample of 39 
farmers, 5 farmers suffered losses amounting to Rs. 5196 without adding the imputed 
market value of their own family labor. Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) in their 
study attribute the risk-aversiveness in smaller farmers with fewer assets to their lesser 
ability for obtaining post-ante consumption smoothing mechanisms. 
Figure 2. Land size-yield relationship in owner-operated farms in 
Jaoti, Madhya Pradesh, India. 
0.83
0.6
1.2
0.36
0.27
1.2
1
2.4
1.94
0.88
0.66
1.04
0.93
1.34
1
0.4
0.92
0.46
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
0.18 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.37 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.62 0.68 1.25 1.25 1.5 1.87 2 4.5 6 8.75
Land sown (ha)
Pr
o
du
ct
iv
ity
 
(t h
a-1
)
An Open Access Journal published by ICRISAT
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
SAT eJournal | ejournal.icrisat.org                                                                                                   August 2006 | Volume 2 | Issue 1
22
0.12
2
1.08
1
0.56
1.2
1.12
1
0.4
0.71
0.5
0.67
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
0.25 0.25 0.37 0.5 0.62 0.75 1.25 2.5 2.5 3 4.25 5
Land sown (ha)
Pr
o
du
ct
iv
ity
 
(t h
a
-
1 )
Figure 3. Land size-yield relationship in owner-operated farms  
in Kherkhedi, Madhya Pradesh, India. 
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Figure 4. Land size-yield relationship in owner-operated farms 
in Kundhankhedi, Madhya Pradesh, India. 
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Profitability 
The average profit of owner-operated farms in the three villages is Rs. 2045 ha
-1
 (range 
Rs. 2166 to Rs. 2636 ha
-1
) (Table 7). The profit for the ICRISAT trial farmers from 
Lalatora village is Rs. 5575 ha
-1
 (non-trial farmers had a profit of Rs. 4688 ha
-1
). Five 
farmers suffered a total loss of Rs. 6102. 
 The relationship between land size and productivity is found inverse with a negative 
correlation of –0.27 providing additional support for the existence of the inverse returns 
to scale relationship. During the first year of the experiment due to better input practices 
ICRISAT trial farmers have been able to attain better yield of 1.1 t ha
-1
 (range 0.51–1.60 t 
ha
-1
) but have not been able to escape the inverse returns phenomenon which has become 
endemic in Indian agriculture. The role played by the monsoon rains has proved to be an 
important factor and in this particular year, excess rainfall has caused the variability in 
the yield of different farms and the waterlogging potentiality of the land has been an 
important determinant. The farmers who have underinvested inputs had done so 
voluntarily to minimize the risks. This factor has been recognized as a significant variable 
in an earlier study by Rosenszweig and Binswanger (1993) for 10 ICRISAT study 
villages using data for ten years from 1975/76. 
Share cropper-operated farms 
A large proportion of land holdings, 79.4% in Vidisha district is reported to be leased-in 
with only 1.7% classified as wholly owned and self-operated and 18% classified as 
‘otherwise operated’, which refers to cultivation on government and common lands 
(Government of Madhya Pradesh 1998). This reflects the presence of an inequitable land 
holding structure, which encourages the active operation of the lease market. The study 
involved the collection of data from 37 share croppers in the three sample villages. There 
are three forms of share cropping in these villages: 
1.  20:80 Under this contract, the landlord undertakes the activities of sowing the seeds 
and the share cropper undertakes application of fertilizers and the rest of the 
activities. The output is shared in the ratio 20:80 between the share cropper and 
landlord. There are eight share croppers (21.6% of the sample) under this 
contract in the sample. 
2.  33:66 All the activities are undertaken by the share cropper and the monetized costs 
and output are shared in the ratio 33:66 between the share cropper and landlord 
respectively. The landlord invests on seeds and fertilizers and the cost is 
shared. Twenty share croppers (54% of the sample) are under this contract in 
the sample. 
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3.  50:50 All the activities are undertaken by the share cropper and the monetized costs 
and input are shared in the ratio 50:50 between the share cropper and landlord. 
The landlord invests on seeds and fertilizers and the cost is shared. Nine among 
the sampled share croppers (24.3% of the sample) are under this contract. 
 The supervision of the share croppers by the landlords is done intensively. The 
landlord does the investment of seeds and fertilizers initially. The labor inputs in terms of 
hired labor to be engaged is decided mutually. The landlord periodically visits the plots 
and instructions are issued to the tenant for accomplishment of activities within a given 
time. 
 The duration of the lease period normally does not exceed two consecutive seasons. 
Although leasing is prohibited in Madhya Pradesh, its enforcement is non-existent, but 
farmers due to risk-averse behavior do not take risks and shift the tenants periodically. 
The emergence of the 20:80 contract wherein the landlord undertakes the sowing and 
fertilizer operation should be seen under this risk-aversive behavior of the landlord to 
escape the legislation where the tiller is the owner. This contract is usually between the 
small and marginal farmers who do not have capital and have only their labor to offer.
 The resource adjustment due to inequitable resource endowment, inequitable 
distribution of land holding, and the banning of tenancy have helped in the emergence of 
the 20:80 contract. The 33:66 contract is also a mechanism for resource adjustment 
between the better endowed landlord and the less endowed tenant. The 50:50 contract is 
perceived by the landlords and even the share croppers as one which leads to a loss to the 
landlord as he has to share a greater proportion of the output. Under this contract, 
generally the tenant is obliged to loan without interest to the landlord. Only the principal 
is returned when the share cropper does not do any further leasing-in. Another reason is 
the non-availability of draft power with the landlord. 
Productivity 
The average soybean productivity of share cropped farms is 0.68 t ha
-1
 and is marginally 
lesser than that of owner-operated farms (0.72 t ha
-1
). The average productivity in the 
three villages of Jaoti, Kherkhedi, and Kundhankhedi varied from 0.54 t ha
-1
 to  0.99 t ha
-1
(Table 12). The highest productivity of 1.05 t ha-1 in Jaoti involved an input of 41 kg of 
DAP ha
-1
 compared to an average of 36.5 kg ha
-1
 for the village and labor input of 29 
person-days ha-1. The lowest productivity of 0.16 t ha-1 involved a higher input intensity 
of 80 kg of DAP ha-1 and labor input of 49 person-days ha-1 (see Tables 13 and 14). 
Therefore, the significant variable determining soybean productivity is the land quality 
and the waterlogging potentiality of the land, although input practices do play an 
important role as the evidence of higher productivity in farms of ICRISAT trial farmers 
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demonstrates. The lowest yield of 0.40 t ha-1 had inputs of 100 kg seed ha-1, 50 kg DAP 
ha-1, no weeding, and 70 person-days of labor ha-1.
Profitability 
The average profit per hectare of the landlords varied between Rs. 494 and Rs. 2672 
compared to that of share croppers which varied between Rs. 131 and Rs. 693. The 
profitability for the landlords is higher. This is despite the non-inclusion of the non-
monetized input costs of the share cropper (cost of the labor by the share cropper and his 
family and interest on the production loans incurred by the share cropper), which 
demonstrates the exploitative nature of the share cropping contracts. Eight landlords 
incurred a loss of Rs. 7021 compared to twelve share croppers who incurred a loss of Rs. 
6027 (Table 15). Under the 20:80 contract while five share croppers incurred a loss, only 
one landlord had a loss reflecting the inequitable nature of the contract (Table 16). In the 
33:66 contract, 5 landlords and 4 share croppers incurred a loss. Under the 50:50 
contract, 2 landlords and 3 share croppers incurred a loss. 
Table 12. Yield and profit of soybean share cropped farms.
Village 
Cost of 
cultivation 
(Rs. ha-1 ) 
Share 
cropper cost
(Rs. ha-1)
Labor
(person- 
days ha-1)
Benefit-
cost ratio 
Yield
(t ha-1)
Gross
output share 
(t ha-1)
Profit
(Rs. ha-1)
Jaoti 2813 1087.00 24 1.35 0.54 0.18 133 
Kherkhedi 4552 1772.00 20 1.59 0.99 0.24 258 
Kundhankhedi 3867 1933.50 34 2.24 0.66 0.33 693 
Table 13. Input intensity of five high productivity soybean farms of share croppers. 
Profit (Rs. ha-1)
Village 
Yield
(t ha-1)
Seed rate 
(kg ha-1)
DAP 
(kg ha-1)
Weeding 
operations 
undertaken 
Labor
(person- 
days ha-1) Landlord Share cropper 
Kherkhedi 2.53 287 172 Nil 86 6361 3369 
Kherkhedi 1.80 100  60 Nil 20 9300  820 
Kherkhedi 1.75 100  50 Hand 48 8150  295 
Kherkhedi 1.67  83   0 Hand 67 9000  165 
Kherkhedi 1.20 100 100 Hand 40 3467 1758 
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Table 14. Input intensity of five low productivity soybean farms of share croppers. 
Profit (Rs. ha-1)
Village
Yield
(t ha-1)
Seed rate 
(kg ha-1)
DAP
(kg ha-1)
Weeding
operations
undertaken
Labor
(person
days ha-1) Landlord Share cropper
Jaoti 0.16 100 80 Hand 49 –987 –57 
Jaoti 0.17 86 49 Hand 27 –417 –48 
Jaoti 0.20 90 33 Hand 17 –414 –42 
Jaoti 0.36 100 40 Nil 8 –357 –357 
Jaoti 0.40 120 96 Nil 19 46 –20 
Table 15. Loss incurred by share croppers in three sample villages.
Village
Loss making share 
croppers
Loss amount 
(Rs.)
Jaoti 5 2080 
Kherkhedi 6 3873 
Kundhankhedi 1 74
   Total 12 6027 
Table 16. Loss incurring landlords and share croppers under different contractual 
arrangements.
Contractual arrangement No. of landlords No. of share croppers 
20:80 1 5 
33:66 5 4 
50:50 2 3 
   Total 8 12 
Land size-productivity relationship 
The relationship between land size and productivity is inverse with a correlation of –0.30. 
The correlation is –0.30 for Jaoti, –0.19 for Kherkhedi, and –0.62 for Kundhankhedi. 
Fertilizer use-land size relationship 
The relationship between fertilizer use and land size is inverse with a correlation of 
–0.32. The correlation is –0.45 for Jaoti and –0.03 for Kherkhedi whereas for 
Kundhankhedi it is positively correlated at 0.46. 
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Labor-land size-yield relationship 
The relationship between landlord labor and land size is inverse with a correlation of  –0.37. 
Similarly the relationship between share cropper labor and land size is inverse with a 
correlation of –0.51. In Jaoti, two share croppers hired out both weeding and harvesting 
operations, while two farmers hired out harvesting operations and one farmer hired out 
weeding operations. Eleven of the twenty share croppers have hired-in-labor during the 
peak harvest seasons as the work has to be accomplished in a short period of time (Figs. 5 
and 6).
 Six farmers who did not do weeding in Jaoti had yields of 0.56, 0.36, 0.20, 0.33, 0.64, 
and 0.40 t ha
-1
 with four farmers having yield lesser than the average of 0.54 t ha
-1
. In 
Kherkhedi, only one farmer hired out the harvesting operations; two farmers did not 
undertake weeding operations and had yields of 2.53 and 1.80 t ha
-1
 which are the highest 
yields among all the share croppers. Both the above farmers had a higher seed rate and 
the input of DAP was also high. In Kundhankhedi, one farmer who did not do weeding 
had an yield of 0.69 t ha
-1
 lower than the average yield of 0.91 t ha
-1
.
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Figure 5. Land size-yield relationship of share cropped farms in  
Jaoti, Madhya Pradesh, India. 
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Figure 6. Land size-yield relationship of share cropped farms  
in Kherkhedi, Madhya Pradesh, India. 
Interlocking transactions 
The cash and kind (wheat) loans are incurred by the tenant at the sowing period in July 
and the landlord repays the tenant’s share after deducting the principal soon after the 
threshing operation is completed in November. The interest charged is 36% on cash 
loans. In Jaoti village, 10 of the 20 share croppers borrowed cash of which four of them 
also borrowed wheat. One share cropper lent Rs. 1500 to the landlord for which no 
interest was charged (50:50 contract). Two share croppers only borrowed wheat. Three 
share croppers reported working on the landlord’s own operated land of which two 
worked without getting wages. In Kherkhedi, four of the 13 share croppers reported 
borrowing both cash and wheat from the landlords and three of them reported working on 
land owned by the landlords. In Kundhankhedi where all the four share croppers have 
been engaged in the 50:50 contract, three of them loaned Rs. 3000, Rs. 2000, and Rs. 
10,000 to the landlord without interest. Among the share croppers, the labor locking with 
landlord has been found weak (two share croppers in Jaoti, three in Kherkhedi, and none 
in Kundhankhedi) although borrowing for production and consumption loans is relatively 
stronger.
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Comparison of owner-operated farms with share 
cropper-operated  farms 
Jaoti village 
The total land sown by the 18 owner-operated farms in Jaoti village was 31.22 ha of 
which 30.62 ha was irrigable land whereas the 20 share croppers cultivated 30.5 ha of 
land of which only 3.5 ha was irrigable. The input intensity is higher in the irrigable land 
(owner-operated) farms. The correlation between land size and DAP application is 
positive but not significant in owner-operated farms (r = 0.22) whereas it is negative in 
the case of share croppers (r = –0.45). The average labor input is 27.6 person-days ha
-1
 in 
owner-operated farms in comparison to a marginal lesser input of 26.2 person-days ha
-1
in share cropped farms. The cost of cultivation per hectare is Rs. 3100 in owner-operated 
farms compared to Rs. 2813 in tenant-operated farms. The average per hectare profit in 
owner-operated farms is Rs. 2636 as compared to Rs. 966 in share cropped farms. The 
difference in soybean yield is substantial (0.78 t ha
-1
 in owner-operated farms in 
comparison to 0.54 t ha
-1 
in share cropper-operated farms); the correlation between land 
size and yield is negative at –0.27 and –0.30 in owner-operated farms and share cropped 
farms respectively. 
Kherkhedi village 
The total sown area of the 12 owner-operated farms is 21.24 ha which is entirely 
irrigable. In the farms of the 13 share croppers, 10.99 ha of the 15.81 ha is irrigable. The 
correlation between land size and DAP is positive (r = 0.08) in the case of owner-
operated farms but not significant compared to a negative correlation among the share 
croppers (r = –0.03). The cost of cultivation per hectare in owner-operated farms is 
Rs. 4035 compared to Rs. 4452.24 in share cropped farms. The investment of labor is 
also lower at 40 person-days ha
-1
 in owner-operated farms in comparison to 57.52 person-
days ha
-1
 among share croppers. The profit per hectare is Rs. 2444 for owner-operated
farms compared to Rs. 3188 for share cropper-operated farms. The higher profit in share 
cropped farms is due to the higher yield (0.99 t ha
-1
) compared to 0.71 t ha
-1
 in the owner-
operated farms. The correlation between land size and yield is negative at –0.38 in 
owner-operated farms in comparison to –0.19 in share cropped farms. 
Kundhankhedi village 
The total sown area of the nine owner-operated farms is 20 ha which is irrigable in 
comparison to four share croppers who leased-in 9.5 ha of irrigated land. The correlation 
between land size and DAP is positive in owner-operated farms (r  = 0.30) and  share 
cropped farms (r = 0.46) but not significant. The investment of labor is 35.45 person-days 
ha
-1
 in owner-operated farms in comparison to lower input of 28.10 person-days ha
-1 
in
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share cropped farms. The cost of cultivation in owner-operated farms is Rs. 3285 ha
-1
 in 
comparison to Rs. 3867 ha
-1
 in share cropper-operated farms. The yield is higher in share 
cropped farms at 0.91 t ha
-1
 compared to 0.66 t ha
-1
 in owner-operated farms. It is, 
however, important to realize that the sample is 4 share croppers compared to 9 owner-
operated farms and the results have to be interpreted with caution as the sample size is 
smaller (the total sample of the village constitutes the total population of the village). 
Overall analysis of the three study villages 
The input intensities of tenant-operated farms need not be lesser than owner-operated 
farms as usually documented in the literature. On the contrary, the labor input is 31.78 
person-days ha
-1
 in share cropped farms compared to 21.22 person-days ha
-1
 in owner-
operated farms (Table 17). The difference in fertilizer (DAP) input is significant with the 
input being more than double in share cropper-operated farms. The cost of cultivation of 
share cropper-operated farms is marginally higher than owner-operated farms, whereas 
the profit per hectare is higher by Rs. 272 in owner-operated farms. The difference in the 
average land size is not significantly different among the ownership categories. The 
average land sown is 1.73, 1.77, and 2.22 in owner-operated farms compared to 1.52, 
1.21, and 2.37 in share cropper-operated farms in Jaoti, Kherkhedi, and Kundhankhedi 
respectively. 
The reason for the higher input intensity in share cropped farms could be due to the 
incentive structures of the contractual arrangement. Thirty of the share croppers were 
engaged either in a 33:66 or 50:50 contract. The cost of inputs (seed and fertilizers) is 
borne by the landlord for which the tenant has to pay an interest (either 33% or 50% of 
the cost). It is, therefore, rational for the landlord to invest more inputs; if the output is 
higher, particularly in the 33:66 contract, greater returns would accrue to him. If the 
returns are poorer as in the 1999 rainy season, the tenant has to pay the interest on the 
production inputs (seed and fertilizers) and since the input intensity is higher, particularly 
Table 17. Comparison between owner-operated and share cropper-operated soybean 
farms in Jaoti, Kherkhedi, and Kundhankhedi villages in Madhya Pradesh, India.
Category 
Cost of 
cultivation 
(Rs. ha-1)
Benefit-cost 
ratio 
Profit
(Rs. ha-1)
Yield
(t ha-1)
Labor input 
(person-days ha-1)
Fertilizer
input  
(kg ha-1)
Owner-operated 
farms 
3320 1.63 2045 0.72 21.22 19.81 
Share copper-
operated farms 
3443 1.54 1773 0.68 31.78 46.76 
1. Data is average of values for the three villages.
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of fertilizer, the landlord gains through greater interest earnings. The above argument is 
supported from the following evidence of the landlords under the 20:80 contract. The cost 
of inputs (seed and fertilizers) is borne by the landlord and the data from Kherkhedi 
village reveals that the average investment of fertilizers is less when the landlord fully 
bears the cost. The input of the fertilizers by the six landlords under the 20:80 contract 
was 0, 0, 60, 60, 50, and 50 kg ha
-1
, and in all the cases the input was less than the 
average (63.25 kg ha
-1
) for the Kherkhedi share croppers. The contracts entered into are 
not sacrosanct and due to the unequal bargaining power, a reduced output would be 
interpreted by the landlord as lack of effort by the share cropper and reduced share would 
be given to him. 
 The profit rate of owner-operated farmers being higher than the landlords who leased-
out land gives support for the argument made by the share croppers that poorer quality 
land is leased out. The evidence in terms of profitability suggests that if the land was of 
better quality, the landlord would prefer to cultivate it on his own. However, one also 
needs to consider that the profitability for the landlord is not just restricted to the 
monetized returns on the crop output; extra income is earned from the interest charged to 
the share cropper. The maximization of his leisure especially under the 33:66 and 50:50 
contracts wherein all the operations are leased-out adds to the profitability of the contract. 
The argument proposed by Bhaduri (1973) of the landlords exploiting the tenants through 
usury and they being more interested in higher income through the money lending than 
higher outputs which would reduce the dependence on the landlords still remains 
relevant.
 The ICRISAT trial farmers have been able to achieve 52.8% higher yield of 1.1 t ha
-1
compared to the average yield of 0.72 t ha
-1 
in the three study villages, but have not been 
able to escape the waterlogging problem. 
 The additional benefits for the landlord is that the supervision costs are less under a 
share cropping contract as the incentive for the share cropper to work hard is high. This is 
due to the inequitable nature of the contracts, which requires a higher output to be 
realized for the realization of sufficient returns, which would enable him to at least earn 
the wage labor costs for the family. The penalty clause is another equally determining 
factor for a greater effort. 
 The difference in productivity between the owner-operated farms (0.72 t ha
-1
) and 
share cropped farms (0.68 t ha
-1
) is not substantial (Table 18). The proportion of dryland 
area in the share cropped farms is 72.90%, while it is only 5.85% in owner-operated 
farms (Table 19). Despite a higher proportion of irrigable land, which hypothetically is of 
better quality, the yield differences between the irrigable land and the dryland have been 
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quite minimal. The determining factor has been the high input intensity in terms of labor 
and fertilizer application in the share cropped land. 
Table 18. Comparative yield of soybean in owner-operated and share cropped farms.
Average yield (t ha
-1
)
Village Owner-operated farms Share cropped farms 
Jaoti 0.78 0.54 
Kherkhedi 0.71 0.99 
Kundhankhedi 0.66 0.91 
   Average 0.72 0.68 
Table 19. Composition of dryland and irrigable land in the owner-operated and 
share cropped farms.
Share cropped Owner-operated 
Village
Dryland
(ha)
Irrigable land
(ha)
Dryland
(ha)
Irrigable land 
(ha)
Jaoti 27.00 3.50 68.06 30.62 
Kherkhedi 13.69 2.12 47.50 33.99 
Kundhankhedi 0.00 9.50 57.00 20.25 
 Total 40.69 15.12 172.56 84.86 
 The results of this study provide evidence on the variation in productivity across 
farms caused due to waterlogging in addition to other variable factors. The variability in 
the productivity of soybean strengthens the risk-aversive behavior of the farmers, more in 
the case of the dryland farmers, which leads to non-optimum input allocation. The study 
provides empirical support to the ‘monitoring’ approach of Cheung (1969), i.e., the 
landlords stipulate and effectively monitor the share croppers’ activities.  It also provides 
evidence of the resulting unequitable distribution of output and ‘credit-locking’ of the 
tenant which strengthens the bargaining power of the landlord in deciding the output 
share contract. 
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Implications of low productivity under a liberalized trade 
regime
The average soybean productivity in India for the year 1999–2000 was 0.94 t ha
-1
compared to 1.75 t ha
-1
 in China, 2.45 t ha
-1
 in USA, and 3.12 t ha
-1
 in the European 
Union. In February 1995 almost all the edible oils have been put under the OGL with an 
import duty of 30% and in July 1998 it was reduced to 15%; however, recently on 
November 21, 2000 this has been again increased to 35% with demand coming from the 
industry for protection. ICRISAT (1999) estimated the subsidy per hectare on irrigated 
soybean at Rs. 2091 compared to Rs. 963 for rainfed soybean (Table 20). The subsidy 
component includes the subsidy on fertilizers as well as the subsidy on credit. It is 
estimated that if all the subsidies were abolished, the profitability of irrigated soybean 
would suffer by 48% and this would induce a shift away from the crop. 
Table 20. Private and social profitability of soybean in irrigated and rainfed land.
Land
Private profit 
(Rs.)
Social profit 
(Rs.)
Subsidies
(Rs. ha
-1
)
Irrigated 4389 –1129 2091 
Rainfed 6390   230  963 
Average 6150  –109  
Source: ICRISAT  (1999).
It is therefore argued that: 
“Since this zone (zone 9, including M.P.) is dominated by a crop that is inefficient in 
resource use and low in generating social returns, it seems that policies that correct 
for distortions in domestic prices would have their desired effect, i.e., a shift away 
from soybean towards sorghum, maize, and pigeonpea to achieve. This must be 
qualified if soybean possesses specific double-crop advantages relative to other rainy 
season-crops.” (ICRISAT 1999, p. 68) 
 It is, however, important to realize that a proactive strategy focused on improving the 
productivity of soybean has a greater scope for welfare enhancement, as the private 
profitability of the crop is higher compared to the above crops. However, this should not 
be at the cost of efficiency; a gradual reduction in subsidies; particularly of fertilizers is 
warranted (a large part of the subsidy is a producer subsidy; in effect the inefficiency of 
the public sector units and private sector units are being subsidized, and freer imports 
would result in their procurement at a lesser cost). This requires not only programs for 
improving management practices for achieving higher productivity but also wider 
reforms in the rural factor markets in credit, insurance, and in the land markets relating to 
leasing.
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Conclusions
Summary 
The average yield of the owner-operated farms in the three sample villages is marginally 
higher at 0.72 t ha
-1 
in comparison to 0.68 t ha
-1 
from sharecropper-operated farms. The 
yield of owner-operated farms in Jaoti village is higher than share cropped farms whereas 
in Kundhankhedi (0.66 t ha
-1
 in owner-operated farms compared to 0.91 t ha
-1 
in share 
cropped farms) and Kherkhedi (0.71 t ha
-1
 compared to 0.99 t ha
-1
 of share cropped 
farms), the yield of owner-operated farms is lesser than share cropped farms. The 
investment of labor, however, is less in owner-operated farms (40 person-days ha
-1
compared to 57.5 person-days ha
-1
 among share croppers).
 It needs to be emphasized that among the owner-operated farms only 4.0 ha (5.52%) 
of the total 72.46 ha sown is unirrigated land constituting 5.52% of unirrigated land in 
comparison to share cropper-operated farms where 40.7 ha (72.90%) of the total sown 
area of 55.81 ha is unirrigated. Although the problem faced by the farmers in the 1999 
rainy season was excess rain and consequent waterlogging, generally dryland is used only 
for one crop in the postrainy season and rest of the year it is left fallow. The growing of 
soybean under rainfed land is generally perceived as an unviable proposition as it delays 
the sowing of the postrainy season crop which is perceived as a more assured crop. The 
correlation between land size and yield is negative in all the cases, except in 
Kundhankhedi owner-operated farm (r = 0.27) (Table 11). 
 The lack of weeding by farmers has been a significant reason for lesser soybean 
yields. The lack of efforts in doing so is due to the perceived risk of a lesser output due to 
waterlogging during the early growth period, which has made the farmers to be risk-
averse and not invest own and hired labor in the weeding operations. The farmers who 
did take the investment risk and weeded their fields were able to get better soybean 
yields. Farmyard manure application played an important role in increasing the yields. 
Even in the absence of DAP, application of FYM increased yields suggesting deficiency 
of plant nutrients other than nitrogen and phosphorus. Subsequent soil analysis confirmed 
this and boron and sulfur were found deficient in the soil. Increased DAP input and 
increased seed rate also contributed to increase in soybean yields. The seed rate of 287 kg 
ha
-1 
resulted in an yield of 2.53 t ha
-1
even without weeding in the farm of a Kherkhedi 
share cropper. This indicates that increased plants oppressed the weeds. 
 The cost of cultivation per hectare of owner-operated farms is high in Jaoti (Rs. 3100 
in comparison to Rs. 2813 for share cropped farms). In Kherkhedi and Kundhankhedi the 
cost of cultivation per hectare of share cropped farms is marginally higher than that of 
owner-operated farms (Rs. 4552 compared to Rs. 4035 and Rs. 3867 compared to Rs. 
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3285 respectively). The profit for owner-operated farms in comparison to leased-out 
farms is as follows: The profit per hectare is higher among owner-operated farms in Jaoti 
(Rs. 2636 vs. Rs. 966, taking the average profit of landlords and share croppers) and 
Kundhankhedi (Rs. 3285 in comparison to Rs. 1386). In Kherkhedi the tenant-operated 
farms have a higher profit (Rs. 3188) compared to Rs. 2444 among owner-operated 
farms. The profit (per hectare) of the tenants in all cases has been lesser than that of the 
landlords; Rs. 133 compared to Rs. 833 in Jaoti and Rs. 258 compared to Rs. 2930 in 
Kherkhedi whereas in Kundhankhedi both have an equal profit of Rs. 693 (50:50 crop 
sharing contract). While 8 landlords incurred loss amounting to Rs. 7021, 12 share 
croppers incurred a loss of Rs. 6979. The evidence from the study suggests that the input 
intensity has been higher in the case of share cropped farms for both labor (31.78 person-
days ha
-1
 in share cropped farms compared to 21.22 person-days ha
-1
 in owner-operated 
farms) and fertilizer (46.76 kg ha
-1
 among share croppers compared to 19.81 kg ha
-1
among owner-operated farms). This is due to the nature of the contract, wherein there is 
strict supervision from the landlord who also gains from interest earnings due to a higher 
investment (either 50% or 33% costs are borne by the tenant). 
 The more important variables have been the waterlogging potentiality of land and the 
quality of land. The lesser profit per hectare leased-in by the share croppers has been 
primarily due to the unequal nature of the share cropping contract, the yield differentials 
not being significantly high. The ICRISAT trial farmers have been able to achieve high 
yield of 1.1 t ha
-1
 (52.8% higher yield) in the 1999 season but have not been able to 
escape the waterlogging problem and the land size-yield relationship is also found inverse 
(r = –0.39). 
 The inverse relationship between land size and productivity remains both among the 
owner-operated and the share cropped farms and the evidence presented here is additional 
evidence to prove the endemic nature of this relationship in Indian agriculture. The 
emergence of the newer forms of share cropping contract (33:66 and 20:80) provides 
additional evidence on the exploitative nature of the share cropping contracts. 
Policy implications  
The policy suggestions put forth in the literature to reduce the inverse relationship 
between land size and productivity include imposition and enforcement of land ceiling, 
and transfer of ownership right to tenants (Junankar 1976) accompanied by provision of 
factor inputs (Cornia 1985). Recent studies suggest that the evidence in enforcement of 
land ceiling and in redistributing land has been poor. Ceiling laws have transferred less 
than 1% of agricultural area to the target group in all except three states. Loopholes in the 
law allowed most of the landlords to avoid expropriation by distributing surplus land to 
relatives and dependents (Appu 1996, Mearns 1998). 
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 An important area wherein reform has to progress at a faster pace is in rural credit 
sector, where the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) has 
started to play a proactive role in promoting and strengthening SHGs. This process has to 
be strengthened and enhanced to reduce the market imperfections in the credit market and 
help the farmers, tenants, and landless laborers in accessing credit at reasonable rates of 
interest. This would help in reducing the problem of under investment of inputs in 
agriculture. The guidelines on this issue have been formulated under the ‘Common 
Principles for Watershed Development’ by the Department of Agriculture and 
Cooperation (GOI 2000). 
 A recent study by Besley and Burgess (1998) using data from sixteen main Indian 
states from 1958 to 1992 find that there is a robust link between land reform and poverty 
reduction and the impact on poverty is mainly through reforms that affect production 
relations rather than by altering the distribution of land. It is argued that the benefits in 
land reform therefore have largely been due to reform in the tenancy contractual relations 
and the rise in agricultural wages. 
 There have been major design flaws in the legislation as well. In Madhya Pradesh, the 
ceilings have been legislated at a higher limit of 10.12 ha from 1960–72 and in the range 
4.05–21.85 ha after 1972 according to the Ceilings on Agricultural Holdings Act of 1960. 
Although, leasing is prohibited under the Land Revenue Code of 1960 (the evidence of 
its existence is established with additional recent empirical evidence), the effect of the 
legislation has only made the contractual arrangements more exploitative with the 
emergence of the 20:80 and 33:66 contracts replacing the more equitable 50:50 contract. 
The lack of implementation of the land ceilings act has only maintained the inequality in 
land holding and due to greater demand for leased-in land. Due to low wages and lesser 
availability of labor in the lean seasons, the labor-locking of the landless and the small 
and marginal farmers due to the share cropping contract has been maintained and the 
exploitative 20:80 contract has emerged as a newer form of exploitation of marginal 
farmers and landless laborers. 
 Commenting on Madhya Pradesh, Besley and Burgess (1998) opine that 
“implementation of reform (is) inefficient, one reason being that the sharecroppers and 
tenants are not recorded” which is due to the lack of political and administrative will. 
Therefore, in the case of Madhya Pradesh neither the reforms in land redistribution nor 
tenancy reforms have been beneficial, due to design flaws and lack of political and 
administrative will in their implementation. 
 The recent policy initiatives of the Government of India on land reforms is in contrast 
to the earlier legislations. The new draft national agricultural policy states that its 
approach on land reforms will focus on ‘development of lease market for increasing the 
An Open Access Journal published by ICRISAT
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
SAT eJournal | ejournal.icrisat.org                                                                                                   August 2006 | Volume 2 | Issue 1
37
size of holdings and by making legal provision for giving private lands on lease for 
cultivation and agri-business’. It also advocates that private sector participation will be 
promoted through contract farming and land leasing arrangements to allow accelerated 
technology transfer, capital inflow and assured market for crop production, especially 
oilseeds, cotton, and horticultural crops (Saxena 2000). 
 In a recent discussion paper of the Planning Commission, Saxena (2000) argues for 
open leasing in developed agricultural markets which would help the share croppers to 
get better rents. It is suggested that the selective open leasing be implemented in a pilot 
mode in selected districts and calls for the enforcement of the existing rigorously 
undeveloped markets even when maintaining that the bureaucracy is corrupt and not 
interested in enforcement of the laws. As argued rightly by Mearns (1998, p. 36) “. . . 
rental markets are an important means by which poor gain access to land. However, 
deregulation of rental markets will benefit the poor only when there is a credible threat of 
ceilings enforcement and where there is possibility of clearly defined and enforceable 
contracts.”
 A radical suggestion is also put forth by Saxena (2000, p. 4) that ‘unless the land 
hunger of the poor is mobilised into a militant movement to neutralize the property 
instinct of the rich farmers, long-term security in law to tenants does not seem to be 
feasible.’ The way forward is the need for political and administrative will to reform the 
design flaws in laws, reform the bureaucracy, and take proactive steps in enforcement of 
land ceilings and initiate tenancy reform measures. The Madhya Pradesh Ceilings on 
Agricultural Land Holdings Act fixed the ceiling at 7 ha for irrigated land, which is at a 
higher limit, but the enforcement is weak even at this limit. The prohibition of leasing has 
only made tenancy to go underground and the study has pointed out to the exploitative 
contracts that have arisen in the rural areas (33:66 and 20:80 crop sharing contracts 
emerging as the widely followed than the earlier, more equitable 50:50 contracts). If 
equitable development has to be achieved land and tenancy reforms need to be given 
utmost importance by the politicians, policymakers, and bureaucrats in Madhya Pradesh. 
The success achieved by the Rajiv Gandhi Watershed Mission in developing watersheds 
since 1996 have to be viewed with caution and it is important to understand the equity of 
the distribution of benefits among the owners, tenants, and the landless laborers. 
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Policy guidelines for the Madhya Pradesh government 
The banning of leasing according to the Land Revenue Code, 1960 has been 
unsuccessful, and the Madhya Pradesh Human Development Report, 1998 admits that in 
Vidisha district, more than 70% of the land holdings are leased-in holdings. Share 
cropping and tenancy should be accepted as a reality, and tenancy reform measures 
should be introduced on contractual terms. Such a reform is possible, with political and 
administrative support. The proactive policy of the current government provides an 
opportunity for the politicians, policymakers, and bureaucrats to initiate changes in the 
legislation and concurrently work with bureaucracy to ensure implementation of the 
legislation. The machinery instituted under the Rajiv Gandhi Watershed Mission, which 
has proactively worked in implementing programs, could be used to act as catalysts of 
change in the mission mode. 
Lessons for the stakeholders in Lateri watershed for the future 
intervention strategies 
? Lalatora micro-watershed which is selected on technical aspects consists of large 
farmers (landlords) who are engaged in the exploitative 20:80 contract with the 
tenants from the adjoining tribal hamlet. It is suggested that future interventions in 
other micro-watersheds should address the equity aspects. 
? In the villages studied soybean is predominantly grown in irrigable area, while most 
of the dryland is left fallow during the rainy season. This aspect needs to be studied 
further covering other areas in Madhya Pradesh. The introduction of short-duration 
varieties along with the promotion of efficient rainwater management and input 
practices needs to be considered so that the dryland farmer’s risk in cultivating 
soybean could be reduced. Research and extension work through the national 
agricultural research systems (NARS) and NGOs should work towards reducing the 
rainy season fallow in Madhya Pradesh. 
? Waterlogging remains a major problem in this region, which could be one of the 
significant causes of under investment of inputs due to the risk-aversion of the 
farmers. Technical solutions to this problem have to be found through farmer 
participatory approaches. 
? The availability of the promoted inputs in the local markets needs to be ascertained 
and efforts should be made to coordinate with the local agricultural agencies to ensure 
the availability. 
 The strengthening and linking of the dormant SHGs with rural banks needs to be 
initiated and the recently initiated Swayam Siddha Project gives an opportunity. There is 
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a need to develop a program to reach out to landless share croppers, particularly those 
who enter into the more exploitative 20:80 share cropping contract.
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